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UNFAIR AND INACTIONABLE: THE CASE FOR A PRIVATE CAUSE OF 
ACTION FOR BUSINESS AND INVESTMENT ACTIVITY UNDER 
PENNSYLVANIA’S UNFAIR TRADE PRACTICES AND CONSUMER 
PROTECTION LAW 
MARK T. WILHELM* 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Pennsylvania’s Unfair Trade Practices and Consumer Protection Law 
(UTPCPL)1 was originally passed in 1968, with a focus on protecting 
Pennsylvania citizens from fraudulent and misleading commercial activity.2  In 
1996, the UTPCPL was amended to include a private cause of action for 
persons asserting a loss under the statute.3  Since that time, and in an effort to 
protect consumers, Pennsylvania courts have applied the UTPCPL broadly to 
encompass many commercial transactions.4  However, when examining the 
application of the UTPCPL, it is clear that business and investment activities are 
not within the scope of the UTPCPL’s private cause of action provision, even 
when undertaken by relatively unsophisticated parties.5 
This Essay will examine the current applicability of the UTPCPL to 
business and investment practices in the context of predatory lending actions 
related to business or investment properties.6  Further, it will present an 
interpretation of the UTPCPL that may allow for a private cause of action for 
improper business and investment transactions under the statute’s current 
construction. 
II. BUSINESS PURPOSE AND PREDATORY LENDING 
The UTPCPL provides a private cause of action to persons affected by 
 
 *  J.D. Candidate, 2015, Villanova University School of Law; B.A. 2012, University 
of Michigan; Executive Editor, Vol. 60, Villanova Law Review. 
1.  73 PA. STAT. ANN. § 201-1 to 201-9.3 (West 2014). 
2.  See id. § 201-3 (outlining unlawful acts under UTPCPL, which include “[u]nfair 
methods of competition” and “unfair or deceptive acts or practices”).  Both “unfair methods of 
competition” and “unfair or deceptive acts or practices” are defined at length in § 201-2(4).  
See id. § 201-2(4); see also Romeo v. Pittsburgh Assocs., 787 A.2d 1027, 1033 (Pa. Super. Ct. 
2001); Seth William Goren, A Pothole on the Road to Recovery: Reliance and Private Class 
Actions Under Pennsylvania’s Unfair Trade Practices and Consumer Protection Law, 107 
DICK. L. REV. 1, 3–6 (2002) (providing history of UTPCPL). 
3.  See Unfair Trade Practices and Consumer Protection Law—Omnibus Amendments, 
No. 1996-146, 1996 Pa. Legis. Serv. (West). 
4.  See Six v. Cole, 8 Pa. D. & C.4th 625, 627 (Ct. Com. Pl. Adams Cnty. 1991) (“The 
purpose of the act has been stated as balancing bargaining positions of buyers with those of 
sellers.”). 
5.  See Levine v. First Am. Title Ins. Co., 682 F. Supp. 2d 442, 466 (E.D. Pa. 2010) 
(noting that availability of cause of action under UTPCPL “depends on the purpose of the 
purchase, not the type of product purchased”).  
6.  Yet the interpretation advanced is equally applicable to any other business or 
investment practice. 
1
Wilhelm: Unfair and Inactionable: The Case for a Private Cause of Action f
Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 2014
26 VILLANOVA LAW REVIEW: TOLLE LEGE [Vol. 60: p. 25 
various types of fraud or misrepresentation occurring as a part of a business 
transaction.7  The parties able to assert this cause of action are limited to “[a]ny 
person who purchases or leases goods or services primarily for personal, family 
or household purposes and thereby suffers any ascertainable loss of money or 
property . . . .”8  Courts have routinely denied private causes of action under the 
UTPCPL where plaintiffs, even in their capacity as individuals,9 have advanced 
a UTPCPL claim in relation to a business or investment interest.10 
In the context of the recent housing collapse, Pennsylvania citizens have 
sought a private cause of action for acts that contributed to the collapse.  Those 
acts notably include predatory lending.11  While no Pennsylvania statute 
explicitly gives rise to a cause of action for predatory lending, Pennsylvania 
courts have recognized an action for predatory lending under the UTPCPL.12  
Yet, those decisions have made it clear that the application of the UTPCPL to 
predatory lending is limited only to acts that are associated with real estate used 
for residential purposes.13 
 
7.  See 73 PA. STAT. ANN. § 201-9.2. 
8.  Id. 
9.  For the purposes of this Essay, the term “individual” is synonymous with “natural 
person” unless otherwise stated. 
10.  See, e.g., Balderston v. Medtronic Sofamor Danek, Inc., 285 F.3d 238, 242 (3d Cir. 
2002) (holding doctor’s purchase of medical device on behalf of patients was not personal, but 
business related); Waldo v. N. Am. Van Lines, Inc., 669 F. Supp. 722, 725 (W.D. Pa. 1987) 
(“The obvious intent of this language is to restrict claims brought under the CPL to those 
which are legitimately of a consumer nature.”).  The Waldo court did admit, however, that its 
“research ha[d] uncovered no Pennsylvania case squarely on point,” and the court 
consequently based its decision on precedent from the U.S. District Court for the Eastern 
District of Pennsylvania.  Id. at 726 (emphasis added).  That is not to say that organizations 
have never been able to bring a claim under the UTPCPL.  See, e.g., Valley Forge Towers S. 
Condo. v. Ron-Ike Foam Insulators, Inc., 574 A.2d 641, 649 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1990) (allowing 
condominium association to assert private cause of action where transaction was for 
residential use by individual unit owners).  But see, e.g., Cumberland Valley Sch. Dist. v. 
Hall-Kimbrell Envtl. Servs., Inc., 639 A.2d 1199, 1201–02 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1994) (declining to 
recognize school district as representative of students for purposes of personal use analysis 
under UTPCPL). 
11.  See generally Kathleen C. Engel & Patricia A. McCoy, A Tale of Three Markets: 
The Law and Economics of Predatory Lending, 80 TEX. L. REV. 1255 (2002) (detailing 
practices associated with predatory lending). 
12.  See Growall v. Maietta, 931 A.2d 667, 676 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2007) (“There is no 
question that the purchase or lease of a home, condominium, or apartment for residential 
purposes comes under the protections of the UTPCPL.”); see also In re McConnell, 390 B.R. 
170, 182 (W.D. Pa. 2008) (“As an initial matter, the Court acknowledges that there is no 
common law cause of action for ‘predatory lending.’  Any claim for relief for predatory 
lending practices must be supported by some statutory basis . . . .”); Sovereign Bank v. 
Gawron, 13 Pa. D. & C.5th 71, 79–80 (Ct. Com. Pl. Lackawanna Cnty. 2010) (reviewing 
approaches to predatory lending causes of action inside and outside of Pennsylvania).  Prior to 
the Growall decision, there was some question regarding whether the UTPCPL in fact applied 
to mortgages and associated loans.  See generally John J. Jacko, III, Are Mortgage Loan 
Transactions Really Subject to Private Actions Under Pennsylvania’s Unfair Trade Practices 
and Consumer Protection Law?, 76 PA. BAR ASS’N Q. 171 (2005) (questioning whether, pre-
Growall, UTPCPL applied to mortgage transactions and arguing that such transactions were 
not actionable under then current interpretation of UTPCPL). 
13.  See Growall, 931 A.2d at 676; Lal v. Ameriquest Mortg. Co., 858 A.2d 119, 124–
25 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2004) (dismissing UTPCPL claim where plaintiff purchased real estate for 
2
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By accepting the use of the UTPCPL for a private cause of action for 
predatory lending—that relates to residential properties, but not for business or 
investment properties—Pennsylvania courts have created a conflicting standard.  
The UTPCPL is designed to protect relatively unsophisticated individuals from 
unscrupulous business practices.14  But the UTPCPL inherently assumes that 
these individuals will always be acting in their capacity as individuals.15  In the 
non-individual context, Pennsylvania courts suggest that plaintiffs should rely 
on common law causes of action to support their claims based in fraud or 
breach of contract.  But in the case of predatory lending, given the lack of a 
common law cause of action, relatively unsophisticated businesses—including 
individuals working in a business capacity or for investment purposes—are left 
unprotected.16  Therefore, due to a lack of a common law remedy for predatory 
lending practices, lenders are free to engage in these practices against 
individuals and businesses alike that would be actionable under the UTPCPL 
but for the business or investment purpose behind the transaction.17 
III. STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION AND THE DEFINITION OF “PERSONAL” 
Persons, broadly defined, may find some recourse under the UTPCPL by 
employing a critical reading of the statute’s text.  The UTPCPL internally 
defines person as “natural persons, corporations, trusts, partnerships, 
incorporated or unincorporated associations, and any other legal entities.”18  
Yet, “personal” is not defined in the statute, despite being one of the main bases 
for a private cause of action under the UTPCPL.19  The dictionary definition of 
 
investment purposes merely because of investment nature of transaction).  However, while 
Growall applied the UTPCPL to residential property transactions with “no question,” the 
court did not state whether the purchase of residential property was a personal purchase or a 
household purchase for purposes of the private cause of action.  See Growall, 931 A.2d at 676. 
14.  See Six v. Cole, 8 Pa. D. & C.4th 625, 627–28 (Ct. Com. Pl. Adams Cnty. 1991) 
(“If consumer protection is the goal, one consumer should be as important as the next.  It 
would matter little to the individual customer whether he or she had been wronged by another 
individual or a giant corporation.”). 
15.  In this way, the UTPCPL implicitly assumes that a natural person acting in a 
business or investment related real estate transaction is in some way more sophisticated, better 
protected, or more informed than the same person, under the same lending circumstances, 
acting in the context of a residential real estate transaction. 
16.  In the context of predatory lending, this situation could arise in many mortgage 
transactions, with examples including a single member limited liability company purchasing a 
rental property or even a natural person purchasing an empty lot for the lot’s investment 
potential.  Given the underlying reasoning for declining to apply the UTPCPL to business and 
investment activity—that these relatively sophisticated parties are already protected by their 
own knowledge and bargaining power—application of the UTPCPL to such activity would 
likely be limited to exclude parties that are seen as somehow more sophisticated and able to 
protect themselves through their routine market actions. 
17.  Indeed, nearly all mortgage loan applications have at least one question regarding 
whether the property will be used for residential or commercial purposes.  While executing 
other loan documents, borrowers are also routinely required to sign statements acknowledging 
the same.  
18.  73 PA. STAT. ANN. § 201-2(2) (West 2014). 
19.  Recall that a private cause of action is available for transactions entered into for 
“personal, family or household purposes . . . .”  See id. § 201-9.2 (emphasis added); see also 
3
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“personal” is “[o]f or affecting a person.”20  Facially, this definition seems to 
contemplate a natural person. 
Given the broad definition of “person” in the UTPCPL, an argument may 
be advanced that business activity falls within the scope of the private cause of 
action, because the definition of “personal”—admittedly taken from the 
dictionary, as opposed to the statute or case law—is something affecting the 
person.  Logically, any activity that affects the statutorily defined person falls 
within the private cause of action.  As such, a business entity—included within 
the scope of person in the UTPCPL—acting in its regular course of business, is 
necessarily engaged in activity that affects itself, the business.  Because the 
business is a person for purposes of the statute, that action of the business is 
personal to the business since the action is of or affecting the business.  That 
business, therefore, should logically have a right to bring a claim under the 
private cause of action provision under the “personal” clause.21 
Understandably, Pennsylvania courts may be hesitant to adopt this 
interpretation of the UTPCPL given its relative creativity.22  In fact, in a 
substantively different context, this interpretation was litigated unsuccessfully 
in a Pennsylvania trial court.23  However, courts admit that the scope of the 
UTPCPL is intended to be interpreted broadly.24  Further, Pennsylvania courts 
have explicitly stated that protecting consumers in real estate transactions, albeit 
to date only in residential transactions, is an important interest contemplated by 
the UTPCPL.25  This combination of intent to protect relatively unsophisticated 
 
supra notes 7–8 and accompanying text. 
20.  BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (9th ed. 2009). 
21.  In thirty states, statutes similar to the UTPCPL would allow a cause of action for a 
business against another business relating to fraudulent or deceptive trade practices.  See 
Michael Flynn & Karen Slater, All We Are Saying Is Give Business a Chance: The 
Application of State UDAP Statutes to Business-to-Business Transactions, 57 CONSUMER FIN. 
L.Q. REP. 60, 66–67 (2003). 
22.  Here, “creativity” refers to the novelty of the interpretation, especially in light of 
many decisions—mostly in federal courts—that simply refuse to apply the UTPCPL to 
business and investment activity, regardless of the identity or nature of the affected actor. 
23.  See Springboro Volunteer Fire Dep’t & Relief Ass’n v. J.C. Moore Indus. Sales 
Corp., 50 Pa. D & C.3d 479, 482 (Ct. Com. Pl. Crawford Cnty. 1988) (declining to apply 
UTPCPL under statutory construction argument to repair of fire truck).  The Springboro court 
reasoned that it did “not believe that repairs to a fire company’s fire truck [were] within 
purview of the type of consumer purchases the legislature intended to protect.”  Id.  Notably, 
the court did not address the logic of the underlying argument, but simply defaulted to its 
interpretation of the legislature’s intent to exclude business purposes from the scope of the 
UTPCPL.  See id. at 482–83. 
24.  See Commonwealth ex rel. Creamer v. Monumental Props., Inc., 329 A.2d 812, 
815 n.5 (Pa. 1974) (“There is no indication of an intent to exclude a class or classes of 
transactions from the ambit of the Consumer Protection Law.  When the Legislature deemed it 
necessary to make an exception from the Law’s scope, it did so in clear language.”); 
Commonwealth ex. rel. Corbett v. Snyder, 977 A.2d 28, 44 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 2009) (“The 
CPL is to be liberally construed to effectuate the legislative goal of consumer protection.”); 
Commonwealth v. Parisi, 873 A.2d 3, 9 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 2005) (“[T]he Law is to be liberally 
construed to effectuate the legislative goal of consumer protection.”); supra note 4 and 
accompanying text.  But see Meyer v. Cmty. Coll. of Beaver Cnty., 93 A.3d 806, 815 (Pa. 
2014) (holding “person” as defined in UTPCPL does not include political subdivision 
agencies). 
25.  See Gabriel v. O’Hara, 534 A.2d 488, 493 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1987) (“Residential real 
4
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consumers, as well as a viable interpretation of the UTPCPL, may provide a 
limited exception to the prohibition against a private cause of action for 
business or investment transactions. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
The above logic regarding the interpretation of “personal” may extend the 
UTPCPL to all real estate transactions in which individuals are put at risk, 
irrespective of the subjective motivations of the individuals.26  Especially in the 
context of predatory lending, given the lack of an alternative cause of action, 
individuals may be left without recourse if they are the victims of predatory 
lending in a business or investment transaction.  If the goal of the UTPCPL is 
indeed to place buyers and sellers on equal ground—particularly in the context 
of large real estate purchases—Pennsylvania courts must adopt a new, broad 
reading of the UTPCPL to protect all consumers, without reviewing consumers’ 
subjective motives through a transaction-by-transaction analysis. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
estate is almost always a consumer’s largest single purchase.  Consequently, the impact of 
unfair or deceptive practices is greatest in this type of transaction.”). 
26.  Of course, this interpretation applies to any application of the UTPCPL, including 
applications for business or investment activity.  However, given precedent, it is unlikely that 
the UTPCPL would be applied to any business or investment transaction where a common law 
or statutory cause of action has been recognized already. 
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